The Rape and Return of China\u27s Cultural Property: How Can Bilateral Agreements Stem the Bleeding of China\u27s Cultural Heritage in a Flawed System? by Taylor, Jason M.
Loyola University Chicago International Law Review
Volume 3
Issue 2 Spring/Summer 2006 Article 8
2006
The Rape and Return of China's Cultural Property:
How Can Bilateral Agreements Stem the Bleeding
of China's Cultural Heritage in a Flawed System?
Jason M. Taylor
Loyola University Chicago, School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lucilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Student Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago
International Law Review by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jason M. Taylor The Rape and Return of China's Cultural Property: How Can Bilateral Agreements Stem the Bleeding of China's Cultural
Heritage in a Flawed System?, 3 Loy. U. Chi. Int'l L. Rev. 233 (2006).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lucilr/vol3/iss2/8
THE RAPE AND RETURN OF CHINA'S CULTURAL PROPERTY:
How CAN BILATERAL AGREEMENTS STEM THE BLEEDING
OF CHINA'S CULTURAL HERITAGE IN A
FLAWED SYSTEM?
Jason M. Taylort
I. Introduction
Beneath the impoverished villages of the Henan province in the People's Re-
public of China lays a wealth of Chinese antiquity.1 Louyang, once the capital
city of at least nine royal Chinese dynasties, exists underneath earth, rock, and
gravel in the form of historical antiquity and yet undiscovered imperial tombs.2
Despite the aesthetic splendor and incalculable scholarly value these tombs pos-
sess to archaeologists and scholars, the fields of Louyang have been repeatedly
raped of much of their buried treasure. Tomb raiders, poor farmers, and rural
families with little money and crude weaponry, seek and loot countless cultural
relics beneath their fields each year in hopes of earning a buck. Because one
major discovery can amount to a year's worth of farming income, the temptation
to pillage relics is often too great to resist.3 Even more startling is the fact that
the destruction and pillaging of Chinese cultural relics has increased in recent
decades. 4 China's National Cultural Relics Bureau estimated that between 1998
and 2003 over 220,000 Chinese tombs have been broken into and looted with the
pieces illicitly sold throughout the world.5
The illicit exportation and illegal trade in Chinese cultural property has a large
domestic component. In 2002, a museum security chief in Chengde, China, was
accused of stealing 158 artifacts over a twelve-year period.6 One such artifact,
"The Buddha of Infinite Life," sold for $295,000 at a Hong Kong auction. 7 Over
500 stone statues have been reported stolen from Buddhist temples and monas-
t Jason M. Taylor is a May 2007 J.D. candidate at Loyola University Chicago School of Law. I
would like to thank Danielle Petaja, Jennifer Schmidt, Jerome Maes, Julie Luketich, and the entire
Loyola University Chicago International Law Review for their continued help editing and aiding the
publication of this article.
I Hannah Beech, Spirited Away, TImEAsIA, October 13, 2003, available at http://www.time.com/
time/asia/covers/501031020/story.html.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See U.S. STATE DEP'T, BUREAU OF EDUC. AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS, PUBLIC SUMMARY: REQUEST
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNDER
ARTICLE 9 OF THE 1970 UNESCO CONVENTION (2004), http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/cnO4sum.html
(last visited Jan. 18, 2006) [hereinafter CHINA'S REQUEST TO THE UNITED STATES UNDER ARTICLE 91.
5 Beech, supra note 1.
6 Id.
7 Id.
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teries, as these types of stone statuary and monuments have become desirable on
the art market in recent years. 8
In addition to China's inability to protect its cultural property within its bor-
ders, a large international component contributes to the illicit export and import
of cultural goods abroad.9 In large part, the current international regime is inade-
quate in controlling the flourishing black market of international antiquity trade.
Despite an international effort to stem illicit import of cultural property, nearly
"seventy-five percent of all antiquities offered for sale in London auctions have
no published provenance." 10 China is particularly at risk because of its sheer
size, vast unexcavated and unprotected cultural sites, and the lure of tomb-raiding
to its poor, rural populations."
Because of the failure of the international regime to prevent looting of Chinese
artifacts and the increased demand in the international market for Chinese antiq-
uities, China recently requested the aid of the United States under Article 9 of the
1970 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
("UNESCO") Convention to employ a vast importation restriction on numerous
forms of Chinese cultural relics. 12 Although the debate is contentious, a bilateral
agreement between the United States and China will strengthen protection of
Chinese cultural relics and ultimately slow the tide of illicit exportation of cul-
tural property worldwide. This type of bilateral support between nations will
ultimately stop illegal exportation of cultural property and, in turn, provide future
generations the opportunity to piece together their own history and cultural
identity.
This essay first explains the importance of cultural property. The illicit expor-
tation of cultural property is a real and continued threat to national, cultural, and
personal identity. This first section specifically focuses on the escalated "rape"
of the cultural heritage of China. Second, this essay details the international ap-
proach to the problem of illicit cultural property trade and the mechanisms envi-
sioned for its prevention. Third, a closer look at the specific legal regime of
China to thwart illicit exportation of cultural goods is required to understand
China's approach to its own unique position as one of the largest "source" states
of cultural property. The fourth section analyzes the legal attempts of China to
address the loss of cultural property and the increasing illicit international dealing
and inadequate international safeguards. This section explains the recent request
by the Chinese government asking the United States to implement importation
restrictions on many categories of Chinese cultural relics. The last two sections
itemize the debate over China's all-inclusive request and what bilateral collabora-
8 CHINA'S REQUEST TO THE UNITED STATES UNDER ARTICLE 9, supra note 4.
9 Michael L. Dutra, Sir, How Much is That Ming Vase in the Window?: Protecting Cultural Relics
in the People's Republic of China, 5 ASIAN-PAc L. & POL'Y J. 62, 66-67 (2004).
10 Beech, supra note 1.
11 Dutra, supra note 9, at 68, 73.
12 See James J. Lally, CPAC Holds Public Hearing, ANcErr COIN COLLECTORS GUILD, Feb. 28,
2005, http://www.accg.us/issues/news/cpacsummary; see also Notice of Receipt of Cultural Property Re-
quest From the Government of the People's Republic of China, 69 Fed. Reg., No. 171 (Dep't of State
Aug. 26, 2004) (indicating that the request was received on May 27, 2004).
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tion of this sort could accomplish for both China and other source nations if the
request is granted.
II. Cultural Property and its Increasing Importance in a Globalized
World
With today's science and technology, the study of ancient cultural property
can write, re-write, and shape our history. Books are scribed, and cultural identi-
ties are forged from the knowledge of a nation's cultural treasures. However,
crude tomb-raiding and looting, together with increased industrialization, threat-
ens many archaeological sites and their treasures. To understand why cultural
property is so important in our globalized world, we must first define what is
cultural property and outline the independent significance of the buried past.
A. What is Cultural Property?
There is no one definition of cultural property. As defined by Article 1 of the
November 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Prevent-
ing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
("1970 UNESCO Convention"), the term cultural property means "property
which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as
being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art, or sci-
ence." 13 Article 1 lists eleven specific categories in which property must fit to be
deemed cultural property including: rare specimens of flora, fauna, or minerals;
products of archaeological excavation; elements of historical monuments; origi-
nal statuary art and sculpture; and rare manuscripts or old books. 14 This broad
definition of cultural property ultimately leaves its designation up to each mem-
ber state. Generally, however, and for the purposes of this article, cultural prop-
erty refers to any tangible, historical object that has some scholarly, historical, or
artistic value. 15
The Law of the People's Republic of China on Protection of Cultural Relics
("2002 Law") uses the term "cultural relics" instead of "cultural property" and
places under state protection a more expansive list of cultural property than envi-
sioned by the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 16 The 2002 law includes "sites of
ancient culture, ancient tombs, ancient architectural structures, cave temples,
stone carvings ... valuable works of art and handicraft articles." 17 In addition,
13 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 1, Nov. 14, 1970, 19 U.S.C. § 2601(6), 823 U.N.T.S. 232
[hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention].
14 See id.
15 Dutra, supra note 9, at 65; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 407 (8th ed. 2004) (noting that
cultural heritage is a term sometimes used broadly to encompass intangibles such as folkore, indigenous
crafts, or skills).
16 Dutra, supra note 9, at 65.
17 Law of the People's Republic of China on Protection of Cultural Relics, (adopted at the 30th
Meeting of the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2002), art. 2, available at http://english.
gov.cnllaws/2005-10/09/content_75322.htm [hereinafter 2002 Law].
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the 2002 Law also protects "important modem and contemporary historic sites,
material objects and typical buildings that are related to major historical events,
revolutionary movements or famous personalities that are highly memorable or
are of great significance for education or for the preservation of historical data"
as well as fossils and material objects reflecting the Chinese social system or the
life of China's various nationalities.1 8 Therefore, items such as stone Buddhist
statuary, jadeware, temple carvings, fossilized flora, and archaeological speci-
mens are all included as Chinese "cultural relics."19
B. Why is Cultural Property Important?
Commentators and scholars espouse several views as to why protection of
cultural property is extremely important. 20 The most important and seemingly
fundamental reasons for cultural property protection include access to the past
and cultural traditions, provision of a cultural identity, and in many instances, an
economic allure. 21 As promulgated by the signatories of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention 22 a global interest in preserving cultural property in its context ac-
knowledges this shared interest:
[Tihe interchange of cultural property among nations for scientific, cul-
tural and educational purposes increases the knowledge of the civilization
of Man, enriches the cultural life of all peoples and inspires mutual re-
spect and appreciation among nations . . . [and] that cultural property
constitutes one of the basic elements of civilization and national culture,
and that its true value can be appreciated only in relation to the fullest
possible information regarding its origin, history and traditional setting. 23
Although enabling the protection of cultural property appears straightforward,
a balance must be struck between access to scholarly study and preservation.
There are essentially two camps in the international arena: (1) source nations
with nationalistic interests, and (2) market nations with internationalism con-
cerns.2 4 Because the globe can generally be separated into these two conflicting
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See Anne Carlisle Schmidt, The Confuciusornis Sanctus: An Examination of Chinese Cultural
Property Law and Policy in Action, 23 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 185, 192-194 (2000) (categorizing
China's specific interests in Cultural Property protection as nationalistic, economic, historical, cultural,
and educational, as well as for prestige purposes); see also LYNDEL VIVIEN PROTT & PATRICK JOSEPH
O'KEEFE, LAW AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE: VOL. III: MOVEMENT 11-14 (1989) (Dr. Prott and Dr.
O'Keefe argue that cultural property advances appreciation and understanding of a culture in the eyes of
others, inspiration, as well as a source of knowledge and access to the cultural past and traditions).
21 Id.
22 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, at Signatory Table, http://erc.unesco.org/cp/conven-
tion.asp?KO=13039&language=E (contains an up to date list of signatories to the 1970 UNESCO
Convention).
23 Id. at preamble.
24 J. DAVID MURPHY, PLUNDER AND PRESERVATION: CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2-3, 155 (1995); Schmidt, supra note 20, at 192-98.
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points of view, 2 5 it is appropriate to briefly lay out a framework to the interna-
tional mode of thought and describe why these views may exacerbate the prob-
lem of international cooperation and protection of cultural property.
Source nations are often referred to as "art rich" developing nations.26 Profes-
sor John Henry Merryman observes: "In source nations, the supply of desirable
cultural property exceeds the internal demand . . . . They are rich in cultural
artifacts beyond any conceivable local use."'27 Generally, these states are eco-
nomically poor and lack the resources to adequately guard their cultural
treasures. 28 Because of the relatively poor economy and vast wealth of cultural
artifacts distributed throughout a so-called source state, tomb-robbing, artifact
mutilation, and corruption are commonly significant problems in these states.
29
China is a classic source nation.
30
In market nations, or "art poor" developed countries, the demand of cultural
property exceeds the supply. 3 1 Market nations often have the financial resources
and infrastructure to acquire rare and expensive cultural artifacts from abroad.
32
In turn, the demand and resources encourage both licit and illicit export from
source nations. 33 Examples of market nations include the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, and the United States.
34
To further delineate the two general camps of cultural property thought, schol-
ars often identify source nations with a "nationalistic" view of cultural property
protection versus the "internationalism" approach of market states.35 The nation-
alistic approach, such as that of China, "gives nations a special interest, implies
the attribution of national character to objects, independently of their locations or
ownerships, and legitimizes national export controls and demands for the 'repa-
triation' of cultural property. ' 36 This view ultimately argues that cultural prop-
erty originating from a source state belongs to that particular state and that
cultural property designed and produced by its own people uniquely reflects the
country's own history and heritage. 37 In the end, cultural nationalism seeks to
25 Cf. MURPHY, supra note 24, at 2 (Discussing a third group of states that exists: transit states. A
transit state is a nation that "can facilitate movement of cultural property from source to market states.
States are 'transit' states by virtue of location .... Other 'transit' states may provide 'title-laundering'
by virtue of their legal system." For example Hong Kong and Macau fit the former category and coun-
tries such as Italy and Switzerland fit the latter).
26 MURPHY, supra note 24, at 2.
27 John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 831,
832 (1986).
28 Dutra, supra note 9, at 65.
29 MURPHY, supra note 24, at 5.
30 Schmidt, supra note 20, at 190.
31 MURPHY, supra note 24, at 2.
32 Id. at 4-5.
33 Merryman, supra note 27, at 832-33.
34 Dutra, supra note 9, at 65-66.
35 Merryman, supra note 27, at 845-46; see also Schmidt, supra note 20, at 192-97.
36 Merryman, supra note 27, at 832.
37 Id. at 846.
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repatriate cultural relics to their country of origin to be studied and displayed by
the descendants of their creators.
3 8
On the other hand, cultural internationalism regards cultural property as the
product of one common human culture independent of place of origin, property
rights, or individual national boundaries.39 "Under this view, the interest in cul-
tural property lies with all nations and people collectively, and claims of individ-
ual states are thus subordinate to the common global interest."' 40 This view is
generally adopted by market nations eager to retain possession of cultural prop-
erty that originated in other source nations.41 One justification for this view cen-
ters upon the financial and technological ability of market states to care for,
protect, and display cultural relics in contrast to the inability of poorer source
states to do the same.
42
The current trend in cultural property protection is towards the nationalistic
view of cultural property protection.4 3 This is in part due to the existing interna-
tional regime that seeks to stem illicit export of cultural property and to stimulate
restitution of cultural objects to their countries of origin.4 4
C. The Costs and Consequences of Illicit Cultural Property Trade
The statistics of illicit trade and export of cultural property are alarming. The
illicit art trade ranks second in the world in terms of profitability, with only the
drug trade ranking higher.4 5 A recent scholarly article claims that practically
"every antiquity that has arrived in America in the past ten to twenty years has
broken the laws of the country from which it came."'4 6 A lucrative and growing
demand on the part of market nations47 necessarily increases the output from
source nations. With this comes the "attendant problems in the source country in
38 Id. at 845.
39 Id. at 831; Kevin F. Jowers, International and National Legal Efforts to Protect Cultural Property:
The 1970 UNESCO Convention, The United States, and Mexico, 38 TEx. INT'L L.J. 145, 147 (2003).
40 Jowers, supra note 39, at 147.
41 Id.
42 See Schmidt, supra note 20, at 196.
43 Merryman, supra note 27, at 846.
44 See generally 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June
24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/l1995culturalprop-
erty/1995culturalproperty-e.htm [hereinafter 1995 UNIDROIT Convention]; 1970 UNESCO Convention,
supra note 13.
45 ISABELLE FELLRATH GAZZINI, CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES: THE ROLE OF ARBITRATION IN
RESOLVING NON-CONTRACTUAL DISPUTES xv-xvi (2004).
46 Jane Warring, Underground Debates: The Fundamental Differences of Opinion That Thwart
UNESCO's Progress in Fighting the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 227,
235 (2005) (quoting THOMAS HOVING, MAKING THE Mumais DANCE: INSIDE THE METROPOLITAN MU-
SEUM OF ART (1993)).
47 See Ministerial Advisory Panel on Illicit Trade, Dep't for Culture, Media and Sport, Report of
Advisory Panel on Illicit Trade 46, (Dec. 2000), http://www.culture.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/2BF7F816-
AA 1A-41BC-993F- 1161F7E3A42A/0/ReportAdPanelIllicitTrade.pdf (estimating that the global art
market between 1994-1998 has grown forty percent in the United Kingdom and as high as eighty-one
percent in the United States).
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the form of destruction of sites, vandalism, loss of scientific data, separation of
relics from context, corruption, and general law-breaking. 48
Pillaging, looting, and illicit trade in China have damaged China's ability to
study its own history completely. China's request to the United States under
Article 9 cites several examples of looting and its destructive effects caused by
the removal of its cultural property.49 For example, in Chifeng City of Inner
Mongolia, it is estimated that over 6,000 ancient sites have been pillaged and
looted in the past twenty years alone.50 More alarming is the extent to which
international actors have contributed to the relevant damage to China's cultural
heritage. One notable incident involves the Tombs of the Marquis of the Jin
State in Shanxi Province.5' The inscribed artifacts excavated from this site are
crucial to the study of the history of the Jin State. 52 However, because the tombs
were pillaged and their artifacts smuggled abroad, the continuity of the historical
record is now broken.53 In addition, ancient stone Buddhist statues have been
looted, seriously compromising the study of the development of style and chro-
nology of Buddhist statuary in China.54
Over the past decade, tens, if not hundreds, of compromising examples from
China abound.55 Escalation of the problem has culminated in China's 2004 re-
quest to the United States for broad importation restrictions on Chinese cultural
property.5 6 Although this attempt at bilateral support will not cure illicit export
of cultural property in general, it would greatly benefit China in its fight against
illicit exportation and destruction of cultural property.
I1. International Regime: 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995
UNIDROIT Convention
Perhaps the first significant piece of international legislation applying to the
protection of cultural property was the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict ("1954 Hague Conven-
tion"). 57 The 1954 Hague Convention was the first international effort to express
a global interest in cultural property protection and introduced a notion of inter-
national cooperation and individual state responsibility. 58 However, the 1954
48 MURPHY, supra note 24, at 54; PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 20, at 11-15.
49 CHINA'S REQUEST TO THE UNITED STATES UNDER ARTICLE 9, supra note 4.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Randy Kennedy & Michael Zao, China's Request for Art-Import Ban Stirs Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2005, at E31; see CHINA'S REQUEST TO THE UNITED STATES UNDER ARTICLE 9, supra note 4.
57 See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14,
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, available at http://www.icomos.org/hague/hague.convention.html [hereinafter
1954 Hague Convention].
58 Warring, supra note 46, at 249.
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Hague Convention does not have any direct application to cultural property pro-
tection during times of peace. 59 Since 1954, two major international agreements
have shaped the global cultural property protection regime during peacetime: the
1970 UNESCO Convention 60 and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects ("1995 UNIDROIT Convention"). 61 Both
conventions are relatively weak insofar as they both set out lofty ideals but do not
provide legal mechanisms of enforcement once adopted by member states.
Moreover, until recently, both lacked the support of major market states. 62
A. The 1970 UNESCO Convention
The 1970 UNESCO Convention marked a decided step away from cultural
internationalism and towards cultural nationalism by endorsing "national cultural
heritage,' 63 and ultimately delegating all the power to signatory states to set up
their own protectionist policies.64 Indeed, a major criticism of the 1970
UNESCO Convention has been the so-called "blank check" 65 provision allowing
member states to define "inalienable" cultural property that is automatically con-
sidered "illicit" if exported. 66 In other words, source states with vast arrays of
cultural history are free to define "cultural property" broadly in terms of what
may be ultimately protected.67
Article 3 provides, "The import, export or transfer of ownership of cultural
property effected contrary to the provisions adopted under this Convention by the
States Parties thereto, shall be illicit."'68 Additionally, Article 13 requires mem-
ber states "to recognize the indefeasible right of each State Party ... to classify
and declare certain cultural property as inalienable which should therefore ipso
facto not be exported, and to facilitate recovery of such property by the State
concerned in cases where it has been exported. ' 69 Taken together, these provi-
sions give source nations, such as China, a blank check to classify cultural prop-
erty, set up national services and policies to protect cultural property, and declare
59 See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 57 (the 1954 Hague Convention applies only to the pro-
tection and safeguarding of cultural property in the event of armed conflict).
60 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 13.
61 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 44.
62 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, at Signatory Table (the United States did not join as a
party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention until 1983, whereas France failed to join until 1997, and the
United Kingdom and Japan failed to join until 2002. China joined the 1970 UNESCO Convention on
November 28, 1989); Warring, supra note 46, at 232.
63 But cf 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 57, at preamble (referring to "the cultural heritage of
all mankind").
64 See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, art. 5-6.
65 Warring, supra note 46, at 251-52.
66 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, art. 13.
67 Warring, supra note 46, at 251-52.
68 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, art. 3.
69 Id. art. 13.
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certain goods "inalienable," making importation and exportation of such property
almost de facto illicit.70
The question then becomes, why would market nations with little of their own
cultural property accede to the 1970 UNESCO Convention when, from their per-
spective, such an international agreement may threaten the economic and politi-
cal agenda of the market state? 7' Perhaps increased inter-connectedness between
nations, the rising awareness of the value of cultural property to national identity,
and the international shift beginning with the 1970 UNESCO Convention toward
a nationalistic view of cultural heritage explain the relatively recent accession of
market states to the international treaties.72 However, with regard to the 1995
UNIDROIT Convention, the most recent international treaty concerning cultural
property, adoption by market states has been slow. 73
B. 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention is a complementary legal mechanism to the
1970 UNESCO Convention and was adopted in Rome, Italy, in June 1995.74 The
1995 UNIDROIT Convention is similar to the 1970 UNESCO Convention in that
it is not retroactive and applies only between state parties after adoption and
entry into force. 75 The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention differs in that it only cov-
ers objects of illicit provenance-either stolen or illicitly exported cultural prop-
erty.76  However, the two Conventions diverge in several respects. One
important difference between the two Conventions is their respective focus.
"The UNIDROIT Convention affords protection to all publicly and privately
owned cultural property, in contrast to the UNESCO Convention's requirement
that the state parties specifically designate all cultural property needing protec-
70 Warring, supra note 46, at 251-52.
71 See id., at 252; see also 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, art. 2(2), art. 12 (Because there
are no specific provisions pertaining to "market states" versus "source states," market nations, those that
by definition have little problem with the illicit export and destruction of their own cultural property, are
reluctant to sign the 1970 UNESCO Convention because the convention is admittedly "nationalistic" in
approach and requires members to take measures to prevent illicit import and promote reparations and
restitution-both potential economic and political "hot spots" for governments).
72 See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, at Signatory Table.
73 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 44, at Signatory Table, http://wwwiunidroit.org/english/
implement/i-95.pdf (There are currently only twenty-six states which are party to the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention).
74 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 44, at preamble.
75 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 44, art. 10.
76 Conference Celebrating the Tenth Anniversary of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, Paris, Fr., June 16, 2005, UNESCO and UNIDROIT-Cooperation
in the Fight Against Illicit Traffic in Cultural Property, at 3, CLT-2005/Conf/803/2, June 25, 2005 [here-
inafter UNESCO and UNIDROIT Information Note]; see also 1995 UNDROIT Convention, supra note
44; 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 13.
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tion."'77 This extends the protection offered by the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention
to yet undiscovered and unexcavated cultural property."
Additionally, the 1970 UNESCO Convention provides guidance on a recovery
phase for stolen, inventoried cultural property. 79 In order to claim restitution, the
1970 UNESCO Convention generally operates through the diplomatic channel of
cooperation and not through any set of private legal mechanisms.80 In contrast,
the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention focuses mainly on restitution and the return of
stolen or illicitly exported cultural objects. 81 The shift in focus of the 1995
UNIDROIT Convention is due in part to the presupposition that a variety of
national schemes have been established to prevent illicit exportation since the
conception of the 1970 UNESCO Convention twenty-five years earlier. 82
A second stark difference in the two international mechanisms is the introduc-
tion of private law provisions to initiate restitution into the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention. 83 The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention "enables both States ... and
individual owners who wish to recover a stolen object, to file a complaint before
a foreign court" where the object is located.8 4 Under Chapter IV, Article 8(2) of
the UNIDROIT Convention, parties may also submit their restitution and return
claims to another court or arbitration, 85 whereas Article 7 of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention only requires that state parties take steps to prevent the importation
of illegally exported cultural property consistent with their own national
legislation.8 6
However, despite the early attempt of the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the
fairly recent articulation of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, exported artifacts
continue to make their way into market states such as the United States.87 Article
5 of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention tries to remedy this situation by requiring
the return of cultural objects, notwithstanding the laws of the state where the
objects are located.88 In addition, to alleviate the harsh effect on good faith pur-
77 Ian M. Goldrich, Balancing the Need For Repatriation of Illegally Removed Cultural Property
With the Interests of Bona Fide Purchasers: Applying the UNIDROIT Convention to the Case of the
Gold Phiale, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 118, 140 (1999).
78 Id.
79 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, art. 7(b)(ii).
80 See id.
81 See 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 44, art. 3-5.
82 UNESCO and UNIDROIT Information Note, supra note 76, at n.16.
83 UNESCO INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. FOR PROMOTING THE RETURN OF CULTURAL PROP. TO ITS
COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN OR ITS RESTITUTION IN CASE OF ILLICIT APPROPRIATION, Promote the Return or
the Restitution of Cultural Property, at *7, http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/file-download.php/30elfl
a9fe869fbebd25e871011419adifkite.pdf [hereinafter The Return or the Restitution of Cultural Property].
84 Id.; 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 44, art. 8(l).
85 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 44, art. 8(2).
86 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, art. 7(a).
87 See CHINA'S REQUEST TO ThE UNITED STATES UNDER ARTICLE 9, supra note 4; see also Goldrich,
supra note 77, at 141.
88 The Convention states:
The court or other competent authority of the State addressed shall order the return of an illegally
exported cultural object if the requesting State establishes that the removal of the object from its
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chasers, the third-party acquirer of the object is entitled to fair compensation for
its return if he or she undertook certain conditions of diligence when the object
was acquired. 89
Despite provisions in the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention favorable to individu-
als and source states that require the return and repatriation of illicitly exported
cultural property, as well as the enhancement of provisions in the 1970 UNESCO
Convention to establish domestic regimes for protection of such objects, neither
international mechanism has been able to stem the rising tide of illicit export.
The most important component that the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention lacks is
major market state support. 90 Without ratification of the 1995 UNIDROIT Con-
vention, market states that are a party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention only
have a legal responsibility to set up some form of import and export control.91
As shown above, putting the onus of enforcement on the offending states has
been largely ineffective. 92 In today's cultural antiquity market and without inter-
national support for both Conventions, implementation of bilateral import con-
trols by market states may be the only way to curb illicit import and export of
cultural property. However, before this latter proposition is developed, a quick
look at China's domestic legal regime is necessary.
IV. China's Domestic Legal Regime
As a signatory to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, 93 China undertook to estab-
lish its own domestic legal regime to protect cultural property and prevent the
illegal export of Chinese cultural objects. The two laws that comprise China's
domestic legal regime for the protection of cultural property are (1) the 2002
Law94 and (2) the People's Republic of China, Criminal Law, adopted in 1997
("1997 Criminal Law"). 9 5 Although this regime is strict in its application of
regulating discovered cultural relics and punishing offenders for noncompliance,
territory significantly impairs one or more of the following interests: (a) the physical Preserva-
tion of the object or of its context; (b) the integrity of a complex object; (c) the preservation of
information of, for example, a scientific or historical character; (d) the traditional or ritual use of
the object by a tribal or indigenous community; or establishes that the object is of significant
cultural importance for the requesting State.
1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 44, art. 5(3).
89 The Return or The Restitution of Cultural Property, supra note 83, at *6.
90 See generally 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 44, at Signatory Table (Currently, the
overwhelming majority of signatories to the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention are traditional source states,
including China. The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention lacks support from major market states such as the
United States, Great Britain, and Japan).
91 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, arts. 6-8.
92 See Part 11(c) and Part III.
93 1970 UNESCO Convention Signatory Table, supra note 22 (China accepted the 1970 UNESCO
Convention on November 28, 1989 and the treaty went into force three months later).
94 See 2002 Law, supra note 17.
95 See Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., May 14, 1997), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/newLaws/criminalLawENG.php
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter 1997 Criminal Law].
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the legislation leaves much to be desired in terms of actually curbing illicit export
of cultural property and tomb-robbing. 96
A. The Interplay of the 2002 Law and the Chinese Constitution
The basis for the Chinese government's authority to regulate the state's cul-
tural property is found in China's 1982 Constitution. 97 Article 22 of the Consti-
tution provides that the state, in addition to promoting literature and the arts,
"protects places of scenic and historical interest, valuable cultural monuments
and relics and other important items of China's historical and cultural heritage."98
The provisions are simply declarations of policy that fail to establish rights or
duties to protect cultural property.99 Yet China has used this power to further
such protection in the recent decade: first, China has nationalized cultural relics
within its boundaries (yet undiscovered or otherwise) 1°° and second, the country
has placed heavy regulations on cultural relics in the possession of private indi-
viduals and public institutions. 01
The 2002 Law replaced a 1982 Cultural Relics Protection Law ("1982 CRPL")
that was highly criticized for lack of jurisdictional rules and for creating inconsis-
tencies between the national government and regional municipalities. 0 2 In many
ways, the 2002 Law fails to rectify the blatant shortcomings of the 1982 CRPL.
The 2002 Law does not provide jurisdictional guidance to regional claims to
cultural relics, nor does it provide a uniform standard for cultural property exca-
vation and preservation.l0 3 Although it is still early to measure any actual suc-
cess or failure, the 2002 Law is criticized for its failure to create incentives for
returning discovered relics to the State.' °4 Furthermore, one commentator argues
that the 2002 Law neither promotes awareness of the ill-effects that the illicit
cultural relics market has on the Chinese people nor provides sufficient sources
of funding to preserve the country's cultural worth. 10 5
The 2002 Law differs from the 1982 CRPL in several ways. The 1982 CRPL
did not allow private individuals to transact in cultural relics with other individu-
als or foreigners.' 0 6 Articles 24 and 25 of the 1982 CRPL permitted individuals
96 Dutra, supra note 9, at 79-80.
97 XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 22, § 1 (1982) (P.R.C.).
98 !d. Additionally, Article 119 of the Constitution grants the governing bodies of autonomous areas
the power to "independently administer" their own cultural affairs and "sort out and protect the cultural
legacy of the nationalities and work for the development and prosperity of their cultures." XIAN FA art.
119, § 1 (1982) (P.R.C.).
99 MURPHY, supra note 24, at 77.
100 2002 Law, supra note 17, art. 2.
1l Id. art. 6.
102 See Cultural Relics Protection Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Nov. 19, 1982 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 1982 CRPL]; Dutra, supra note 9, at 80-81.
103 Dutra, supra note 9, at 82.
104 Id. at 82-83.
105 Id. at 83.
106 MURPHY, supra note 24, at 93-94; see 1982 CRPL, supra note 102, arts. 24-25.
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who owned Chinese cultural relics to only sell them to the state through state
sales administration. 10 7 The 2002 Law, on the other hand, permits individuals
and organizations to collect cultural relics in several ways:
(1) lawfully inheriting or accepting gifts;
(2) purchasing from cultural relics stores;
(3) purchasing from auction enterprises engaged in the auction of cultural
relics;
(4) mutually exchanging or transferring lawfully owned relics in accordance
with applicable law; or
(5) other lawful channels prescribed by the State.108
The government prohibits the sale or exchange of cultural relics owned by the
state, including newly discovered or excavated relics, valuable cultural relics in
the collections of cultural institutions, and immoveable cultural relics such as
murals, carvings, or components of ancient buildings. 10 9
The legalization of private transactions and the creation of a licit cultural prop-
erty market in China under the 2002 Law may stem from the government's rec-
ognition of its inability to pay high market prices for cultural relics. I10 This free-
market cultural property exchange may drive up the price legitimate collectors or
institutions pay for cultural objects, because they are no longer paying for objects
from poor villagers, but instead from savvy art dealers or institutions."' How-
ever, allowing individuals and institutions to purchase legally obtained cultural
relics should eliminate some desire to seek out tomb-robbers and middlemen
smugglers who promote destructive techniques in acquiring cultural goods. 112
By creating a system that allows the "free trade" of cultural property between
organizations, individuals, and licensed auction houses, the state should be able
to keep better track of the cultural property trade within China and its sale
abroad. 1 3 But despite these innovations, the 2002 Law does not provide a real
disincentive to deter tomb robbers and illegal excavators who still have much to
gain from the illicit sale of cultural relics to smugglers.
The 2002 Law also established auction enterprises and cultural relics stores to
assist in cataloging and tracking cultural property. 114 These two mechanisms for
establishing a licit cultural property market are distinct, meaning that auction
enterprises cannot establish cultural relics stores and vice versa, but they share
the similar requirement that administrative officials must be permitted to examine
107 1982 CRPL, supra note 102, arts. 24-25.
108 2002 Law, supra note 17, art. 50.
109 Id. art. 51.
110 See Dutra, supra note 9, at 84.
111 See 2002 Law, supra note 17, art. 50.
112 This may be true simply by virtue that the 2002 Law provides a legal avenue by which individuals
can obtain and transact in Chinese cultural artifacts and who are not otherwise predisposed to break the
law.
113 See Dutra, supra note 9, at 84.
114 2002 Law, supra note 17, arts. 56-57.
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and verify each cultural object for sale or exchange. 1 5 In addition, Article 58
grants the Administrative Department for Cultural Relics broad power to "desig-
nate an institution for the collection of state-owned cultural relics to enjoy the
priority in purchasing the valuable" objects up for auction during the mandatory
examination period under Article 56. 116 Finally, cultural relic stores and auction
houses must keep records of cultural relics they purchase, sell, or auction, and
submit the records to the Administrative Department for Cultural Relics for cen-
tralized cataloging.' 1 7
Cataloging, examining, and keeping records of cultural relics in the way envi-
sioned under the 2002 Law is a step in the right direction. A licit market for
cultural relics and the required examination and verification of such items should
at least stem the movement and sale of illegally obtained cultural objects within
China. The record keeping system could potentially alert state administrators to
"new" cultural relics emerging on the exchange market and provide a way to
trace where a particular piece came from. However, even this system has its
flaws and limitations.
One such limitation has already been mentioned: a lack of incentive to stop
vandalizing ancient sites by tomb-robbers. Additionally, Article 58 grants to the
government a purchase option allowing the state to buy valuable cultural relics at
a price ultimately determined by the state.118 Illicit export remains desirable to
many because smugglers can get more for cultural relics outside the country in
market states, and less reputable individuals may be unwilling to sell at an auc-
tion house because of a potential below-market offer by the state.1 19
Defining the scope of export restrictions under the 2002 Law is difficult. This
is true, in part, because of the vague definitions set out by the 2002 Law. China
has long classified its cultural property into "grades," and the 2002 Law contin-
ues this tradition.1 20 For instance, the 2002 Law divides cultural relics into "val-
uable" cultural relics and "ordinary" cultural relics.' 2 1 Valuable cultural relics
are further broken down into grade-one, grade-two, and grade-three cultural
relics. 122 Grade-one cultural relics are "especially important for historical, artis-
tic, and scientific values."' 23 Grade-two are those cultural relics that have "im-
portant" cultural value.' 24 Grade-three cultural relics are "relatively important"
I5 Id. arts. 54-56 (stating that officials of the Administrative Department for Cultural Relics for the
People's government of the relevant province or municipality conduct the examination and verification of
cultural relics prior to sale or exchange).
116 Id. art. 58.
117 Id. art. 57.
118 See id. art. 58.
119 See Dutra, supra note 9, at 84.
120 Id.
121 2002 Law, supra note 17, art. 3; see Rating Standards for Cultural Relics Collections (promulgated
by the Ministry of Culture, Apr. 9, 2001, effective Apr. 9, 2001), art. 1, translated in LawlnfoChina (last
visited Apr. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Rating Standards for Cultural Relics].
122 2002 Law, supra note 17, art. 3.
123 Rating Standards for Cultural Relics, supra note 121, art. 1.
124 See id. art. 2.
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to China's cultural heritage. 125 Cultural relics deemed ordinary are those that
only have "certain historical, artistic, and scientific value."' 126 The problem,
however, is that there is no other substantive guidance to differentiate between
the relative grades of cultural property. 127 This vagueness exacerbates the prob-
lem of categorizing both existing and newly discovered objects, as well as track-
ing illicit and licit export of cultural property, and determining the criminal
punishment for offenders. 128
The 2002 Law contains other shortcomings. For example, the disjointed ap-
proach to preservation of cultural property leaves the tasks to local municipalities
that often have inadequate resources to properly care for important relics.129 The
central government takes on the responsibility of preserving and protecting valu-
able grade-one cultural relics and leaves the preservation of the lower grade an-
tiquities to local levels of government.' 30 Additionally, the 2002 Law prohibits
certain valuable grade-one cultural relics from being exported from China at all,
except in certain and limited cases for exhibition.13 1 This ban on prohibiting the
exportation of certain valuable cultural property is difficult to enforce because of
the vague definition of what constitutes a valuable grade-one relic. 132 However,
this flaw is arguably balanced by the flexibility that the language of the 2002
Law provides to administrators in issuing or denying export permits for specific
pieces because of the broad subjective nature of the classification system.' 33
B. The 1997 Criminal Law
The 1997 Criminal Law penalizes violators of both the 2002 Law and the 1982
Constitution. The 2002 Law only speaks in terms of "moral encouragement" for
the return of illegally acquired or discovered cultural relics.1 34 It does not pro-
vide for a readily identifiable punishment for violation of its provisions, but only
indicates that violators will be subject to both criminal and civil liability, and
punishment "according to law."' 35 The 1997 Criminal Law ultimately deter-
mines the consequences for illegal activity as defined by the 2002 Law and the
Chinese constitution.' 36
125 Id. art 3.
126 Id. art 4.
127 See id. art. 6. The Ratings Standards for Cultural Relics articulated in April 2001 further defined
what constitutes grade-one cultural relics for several categories including woodcarvings, coins, bronze
ware, jade ware, stone carvings, and certain pottery, but failed to specifically define those relics that fall
into the grade-two or grade-three category.
128 See Dutra, supra note 9, at 84-86.
129 Dutra, supra note 9, at 86.
130 Id.
131 See 2002 Law, art. 60-63.
132 Dutra, supra note 9, at 87.
133 See id.
134 2002 Law, supra note 17, art. 12.
135 See 2002 Law, supra note 17, ch. VII.
136 1997 Criminal Law, supra note 95, arts. 1, 324.
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The 1997 Criminal Law specifically addresses "crimes of obstructing cultural
and historical relics control." 137 The Law imposes criminal liability for damag-
ing or destroying cultural property,1 38 selling privately prohibited cultural
relics, 139 selling cultural property for profit, 140 selling cultural property by a mu-
seum,14 1 or illegally excavating ancient sites or remains. 142 The actual criminal
penalties for actions prohibited by the 1997 Criminal Law range from fines and
confiscation of cultural objects to prison sentences, and in serious or heinous
cases, even death. 143 The 1997 Criminal Law also forbids the cross-border trans-
portation of "prohibited cultural relics" out of China with a minimum five-year
prison sentence for violators. 44
The provisions governing cultural property protection suffer from the same
vagueness as the 2002 Law. The punishment for illegally transporting cultural
property or damaging cultural relics depends upon both the grade of the cultural
relic in question and the seriousness of the offense.1 45 The 1997 Criminal Law
explicitly lists certain conduct which may warrant the imposition of a sentence of
imprisonment or even death, such as repeated illegal excavation or acting as a
ring leader in a conspiracy to illicitly export cultural property.146 In other re-
spects, the law fails to clearly delineate how "ordinary," "serious," "heinous,"
and "exceptionally serious" offenses differ.1 47
In theory, the Chinese judiciary can choose between the seriousness of a par-
ticular offense and the corresponding penalty. 48 Arguably, this provides for
some level of deterrence to potential offenders because the penalty for being
caught is relatively unknown prior to engaging in the illegal activity.1 49 How-
ever, without a consistent application of penalties under the 1997 Criminal Law,
including the possibility of receiving light treatment, smugglers and individuals
may be willing to take their chances in court, especially with the large payouts
from illicit export of cultural property. To provide the most effective level of
deterrence, the 1997 Criminal Law must be applied harshly and consistently to
offenders.' 50
137 See id. arts. 324-29.
138 Id. art. 324.
139 Id. art. 325.
140 Id. art. 326.
141 Id. art. 327.
142 Id. art. 328.
143 See id.; Dutra, supra note 9, at 90.
144 See 1997 Criminal Law, supra note 95, art. 151; Dutra, supra note 9, at 91-92.
145 See 1997 Criminal Law, supra note 95, arts. 324-28.
146 See id. art. 328; Dutra, supra note 9, at 90.
147 Dutra, supra note 9, at 91.
148 Id. at 92.
149 Id.
150 See id. at 92-93 (arguing that judges may be unwilling to impose the harsh statutorily prescribed
penalties, seemingly because of the highly disjointed and vague nature of the legal system as it exists
today).
248 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 3, Issue 2
The Rape and Return of China's Cultural Property
In summary, the vague nature of the 2002 Law and the 1997 Criminal Law in
defining restricted cultural antiquities, coupled with a broad and highly discre-
tionary process for granting export permits, severely handicaps China's ability to
control illicit export of cultural property. In the words of Professor Dutra, "The
flow of Chinese cultural antiquities will go unstaunched so long as there is an
eager market for such items outside of China. The [2002 Law] does little to
rectify the situation and its vagueness does not solve the problem."' 151 Therefore,
it seems that without some international or bilateral cooperation, China's domes-
tic regime as it stands is ineffective at preventing the loss of Chinese cultural
property. The failure of international mechanisms, namely the reluctance of mar-
ket states to join the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention to strictly monitor importation
of cultural property, combined with the impotence of China's domestic regime,
require a new approach to cultural property protection. The subsequent sections
detail China's latest attempt to reach out for help152 and how the forthcoming
response of a major market state, such as the United States, could prove to be a
key component in stopping the illicit cultural property trade.
V. China's Request to the United States Under Article 9
The failure of both the international and domestic mechanisms for preventing
the export of cultural property led the People's Republic of China to request
assistance from the United States. 153 The request to the United States was made
under Article 9 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention in December 2004.154 On
February 17, 2005, a public hearing was held before the U.S. State Department
Cultural Property Advisory Committee to determine whether the United States
would grant China's request for import restrictions on certain objects of cultural
property. 155 As of August 7, 2006, China's request was still pending. 156
A. China's Unique Position and Request to the United States
Despite the domestic legal regime of China, the government's recent request
recognizes the current law's shortcomings and the increase in the pillaging and
smuggling of China's cultural artifacts. 157 What makes this request different, in
some respects, is the historical nature and importance of China's unique position
151 Id. at 88.
152 See generally CHINA'S REQUEST TO THE UNITED STATES UNDER ARTICLE 9, supra note 4.
153 Id.; see SAFE: Saving Antiquities for Everyone, Say No to Plunder, Yes to Bilateral Agreements,
http://www.savingantiquities.org/i-safe-mou.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (the request was not com-
pletely unprecedented: similar requests, albeit not as extensive nor from source nations as large as China,
have been made to the United States from ten nations, including Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, and Mali to
impose similar import restrictions on cultural property).
154 CHINA'S REQUEST TO THE UNITED STATES UNDER ARTICLE 9, supra note 4.
155 Laity, supra note 12.
156 See generally U.S. State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Protecting Cul-
tural Property Worldwide, http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/whatsnew.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2006)
(listing pending requests, scheduled upcoming advisory committee meetings, and recent notices).
157 CHINA'S REQUEST TO THE UNITED STATES UNDER ARTICLE 9, supra note 4, at *1.
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in world history. "China is one of the few cultures in the world with an unbroken
cultural record from the prehistory to the present. Chinese history and archaeol-
ogy is, therefore, key to understanding the process of development of human
society and civilization."1 58
Today, China boasts one of the largest and most studied cultural histories in
the world. 159 Thousands of archaeological sites, many yet unearthed, provide
rich cultural knowledge and the "potential for reconstructing history . . . related
to the origins of man, domestication of rice and millet, origins of writing, paper,
and printing, as well as silk and porcelain technology."1 60 Additionally, as the
market for Chinese antiquities continues to grow and as illegally obtained cul-
tural relics are increasingly found in galleries, auction houses, and Chinese cus-
toms offices bound for the United States,16' the threat of losing Chinese cultural
knowledge is dangerously real.
China's request to the United States under Article 9 seeks import control re-
strictions on cultural property from pre-history to 1911 encompassing:
(1) Metals: bronze, gold, and silver vessels, sculpture utensils, jewelry, coins
weapons, and armor;
(2) Ceramic: stoneware and porcelain vessels, sculpture, jewelry, and archi-
tectural elements;
(3) Stone: vessels, sculpture, weapons, utensils, jewelry, and architectural
elements;
(4) Textiles: silk clothing, hangings, and furnishings;
(5) Lacquer, bone, ivory, and horn objects, including inscribed materials; and
(6) Wood and bamboo objects, including inscribed objects. 16 2
If granted, United States customs officials could examine and seize all cultural
property within the designated scope of the import restrictions that are not ac-
companied by special export certification granted by the Chinese government. 163
Additionally, it is likely that the agreement would explain procedures for the
preservation and ultimate restitution of all objects denied admittance to the
United States.
B. The United States' Response to the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act
In 1983, when the United States joined the 1970 UNESCO Convention, it
created the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act ("CCPIA").' 64
158 Id. at *10.
159 See generally id.
160 Id. at *10.
161 See id.; see also Kennedy & Zao, supra note 56, at E31 (providing a look at both sides of the
debate on whether or not the numbers of Chinese antiquities making their way to the United States
market are relatively significant when compared with other market states or over inflated).
162 CHINA'S REQUEST TO THE UNITED STATES UNDER ARTICLE 9, supra note 4, at *11.
163 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2606 (2006). [hereinafter
CCPIA].
164 See id. §§ 2601-13.
250 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 3, Issue 2
The Rape and Return of China's Cultural Property
Under the CCPIA, nations that are a party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention may
submit a request to the U.S. State Department seeking import controls on certain
categories of archaeological or ethnological materials. 165 The CCPIA then gives
the President of the United States the ultimate power to enter into bilateral or
multilateral agreements, the purpose of which is to protect the respective coun-
try's cultural patrimony. 166 The CCPIA also establishes a Cultural Property Ad-
visory Committee 167 that conducts an investigation, including calling a public
hearing for each individual request, and provides the State Department and Presi-
dent with its ultimate recommendation as to whether to grant or deny the import
control restrictions.' 68
Whether the Advisory Committee recommends granting the import restriction
request and whether the President ultimately adopts its recommendation turns on
four determinations spelled out in the CCPIA. 169 Specifically, in the case of
China, the Advisory Committee and ultimately the President must determine:
(1) Whether the cultural patrimony of China is in jeopardy from looting of
archaeological or ethnological materials;
(2) Whether China has taken internal steps (has effective laws in place and
engages in law enforcement to protect its cultural patrimony through a variety of
means) consistent with the UNESCO Convention;
(3) Whether other nations with a significant import trade in Chinese archaeo-
logical materials are participating in a concerted effort to prevent import of pil-
laged materials; and
(4) Whether the imposition of import restrictions will assist in the legitimate
international exchange of cultural materials in ways that do not endanger China's
cultural patrimony. 170
Whether China has satisfied the four requirements for a favorable recommen-
dation was the major topic of debate during the February 17, 2005 public hear-
ing. 17' The respective sides of the debate and the importance of a favorable
finding for China and the international community will be covered in the remain-
ing sections of this article.
C. The Debate
A range of proponents and opponents to China's request to the United States
under Article 9 testified before the Advisory Committee at the February 2005
165 See id. § 2602.
166 Id.
167 See id., § 2605 (providing that the Cultural Property Advisory Committee is appointed by the
President and consists of eleven private citizens who are experts in archaeology and anthropology; ex-
perts in the international sale of cultural property; and who represent the interests of museums and the
general public).
168 Id.
169 Id. § 2602.
170 Id.
171 See generally Lally, supra note 12.
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hearing.1 72 This list includes auction house staff, museum curators, professors,
art dealers, and lawyers representing dealers and collectors' associations. 173 The
speakers who advocated accepting China's request for import restrictions are of
the opinion that "archaeological investigation and research must be given pri-
macy over all other possible approaches to cultural property, and any proposed
restrictions which might enhance the preservation, protection and retention of
archaeological materials in China should be implemented.1 74 The opponents of
China's request argue: (1) that China's domestic legal regime is not sufficient to
protect its own cultural property and that China should strengthen its own laws
first; (2) growth of China's internal market for illicit trade is the real problem and
is far worse than the small illicit market for Chinese antiquities in the United
States; and (3) such a broad import restriction on cultural property will deny U.S.
scholars, museums, and the international community in general access to cultural
knowledge, study, and the ability to exhibit China's heritage. 175
The three main issues behind the opponents' position that the request should
be denied (or severely modified) are intertwined. "According to Arthur Hough-
ton, a former CPAC member, currently with the American Council for Cultural
Property, China 'cannot be a potted plant,' and it 'must make more efforts at self-
restraint.' "176 In one respect, the lack of internal effectiveness is directly corre-
lated to the growing internal market for antiquities in China. Of the forty-eight
major, and many other minor, auction houses operating in China, the government
either sanctions or partially owns them all.' 77 "Some of these domestic auction
houses, notably the Poly Group, have sold excavated tomb figures, even promot-
ing them on the covers of their catalogues."1 78 Many opponents suggest that the
weaknesses of the Chinese legal regime gives rise to a large domestic market that
in turn drives illegal excavation and the sale of cultural property. 179 Logically
then, the implementation of a broad import restriction of Chinese antiquities in
the United States will do little or nothing to aid the Chinese. China must help
itself first.
The last argument of the opponents' position combines two premises: (1) that
there is a relatively small market for Chinese antiquity in the United States, and
(2) such a broad request and failure to invite other large market states (such as
172 Id.
173 Id. (Mr. Lally is an art dealer from New York who was present at the CPAC public hearing on
China's Request to the United States Under Article 9 and was a speaker against granting China's request.
His short online article provides a breakdown of the hearing, its speakers, and his personal impressions of
the hearing).
174 Id.
175 See SAFE, supra note 153; see Ashton Hawkins & Kate Fitz Gibbons, This Property Claim Should
Be Condemned, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2005, at D6.
176 Laura B. Whitman, China's Request: Is the US Government on the Verge of Shutting Down the
Market in Chinese Antiquities?, ORIENTATIONS, Apr. 2005, http://www.orientations.com.hk/hmapr05.
htm.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 See id.
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the United Kingdom, for example) will only hurt the United States' cultural inter-
ests while not solving the problem. 180 One speaker hinted at the difficulty of
examining and studying Chinese cultural property if the import ban was
granted. 181 By not being able to import objects into a museum's permanent col-
lection, a dampening of cultural exchange will emerge and museums in the
United States would not be able to study cultural property without expensive
travel.1 82 This, in the eyes of one opponent, "would deny the public at large the
opportunity to fully appreciate an important world culture," while access to Chi-
nese art elsewhere in the world would freely be enjoyed. 183
D. Importance of Granting China's Request and its Effect on International
Cultural Property Protection
While the opponents to granting China's request make valid observations and
are generally concerned with the protection of cultural property and the rampant
problems the illicit market can cause, much of their criticism is overstated and
fails to take into account the monumental importance of this first step. At the
outset, China's request is admittedly broad.184 However, that the request at-
tempts to cover a wide range of cultural property should not overshadow the
importance of increased dialogue between nations and the ultimate goal of
shrinking the illicit export and destruction of cultural property.
First, the most fundamental consequence of granting China's request, and per-
haps most overlooked by opponents, would be the dramatic increase in dialogue
between the United States and China. 18 5 The problem of illicit export of cultural
property is much larger than between the United States and China, as evidenced
by international attempts to prevent and preserve cultural property. 186 However,
the problem presented here exists principally between these two states. For exam-
ple, Chinese antiquities sold at Sotheby's for a total of $34 million in 2004.187
Bringing these two large international players together to negotiate a bilateral
arrangement for importation restrictions on Chinese cultural property would pro-
mote increased cooperation between the two states. This would likely foster bet-
ter relations in the future and allow state-certified cultural property to travel to
the United States, and vice versa, either for study or exhibition.
180 Whitman, supra note 176.
181 Id.
182 Hawkins & Gibbons, supra note 175.
183 Id.
184 See Whitman, supra note 176. "Although technically 15 to 7 in opposition to the request, some
pro-request speakers admitted that China's demand was unreasonably broad, and should be modified to
focus only on the protection of certain archaeological sites and materials." Id.
185 This may be true simply because representatives must meet, draft, and coordinate terms of any
agreement, as well as negotiate from time to time additional memorandums of understanding concerning
cultural property protection. See generally U.S. State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs, Protecting Cultural Property Worldwide, supra note 156.
186 See generally SAFE, supra note 153.
187 See Hawkins & Gibbons, supra note 175.
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Second, granting China's request would result in a comprehensive set of im-
portation restrictions and methods for the preservation and return of seized prop-
erty to China. This legal framework would be the first of its kind on a large scale
and would provide other source and market nations with guidance to draft similar
bilateral agreements.' 88 The ultimate goal of China's request, at least from a
global standpoint, should be to create a web of bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments to protect against the illicit importation of cultural property.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, to the extent import restrictions will
deny the entry of illicitly exported cultural property to the United States, the
market for such objects will begin to shrink. If smugglers in the United States
are reluctant to risk spending money to import illegal goods because of the broad
protection offered by the import restriction, demand for illegal relics will de-
crease. Indeed, demand fuels the supply side of the equation.
The argument that granting China's request will deny only United States citi-
zens and museums access to Chinese cultural heritage is unpersuasive. Although
many artifacts already on the market lack identifiable provenance, with technol-
ogy and increased knowledge of ancient China, many can likely be identified as
Chinese in origin and returned for examination and further study. 189 This ad-
dresses the problem of the current black market in cultural property. In a related
respect, a more complete record of Chinese cultural heritage will lead to in-
creased worldwide knowledge through publication, exhibition, and cultural reci-
procity. That China would hoard every piece of its cultural heritage and deprive
the rest of the world from its past is impractical, at least insomuch as it would be
practical for the United States to do the same thing. Finally, China itself is capa-
ble of making advancements and preserving cultural property for study,190 and
the role of the conservator should not belong to the United States alone.
VI. Conclusion
The system for preventing the plundering and black market resale of Chinese
cultural property is flawed. International mechanisms and the Chinese legal re-
gime to preserve and prevent the illicit export of cultural property both suffer
from shortcomings. However, the recognition of this fact, as well as the fact that
the international treaty system is lacking large, influential support from market
nations does not mean all hope is lost. Today, the problem of illicit export and
destruction of cultural property is at its peak. China's request to the United
188 To date, the United States has entered into cultural property agreements or taken emergency action
to protect archaeological and/or ethnological materials in Bolivia, Cambodia, Cyprus Archaeological
Material, Cyprus Ethnological Material, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, Mali, Nicaragua, and
Peru. SAFE, supra note 153. The sheer size and scope of the request and antiquities market in China
makes China's request different.
189 Beech, supra note 1.
190 There is considerable debate as to whether or not China is actually the preferred nation to safe-
guard the many sites of archaeological and cultural importance. See Saving Antiquities for Everyone,
SAFE Supports China's Request For Help to Protect Its Cultural Heritage, http://www.savingantiquities.
org/i-safe-china.htm#no (last visited Aug. 7, 2006). Rapid industrialization and urban expansion are
often referred to as large factors in the destruction of Chinese cultural property at the hands of their own
government. However, this internal aspect of cultural property protection is not addressed in this article.
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States under Article 9 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention represents the first in a
large-scale effort of bilateral and multilateral treaties to turn the tide.
By granting China's request, the United States will encourage dialogue in the
realm of protecting cultural property. Bringing the two states together will set a
precedent of cooperation. Additionally, by closing a large market for illicit Chi-
nese goods, the internal market in China will begin to deteriorate because there
will be less demand, and in turn, less return on illicit cultural property. Moreo-
ver, increased dialogue and cooperation between parties will foster cultural re-
spect and allow for greater understanding of China's cultural heritage. As part of
the increase in international cooperation and study, it is very likely that the flow
of exhibitions and state sanctioned export of certain antiquities would follow.
However, granting China's one request will not solve the problem. It will take
the concerted effort of all states, market and source states alike, to create an
intertwining web of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Agreements that re-
strict the import of cultural property without state specific certification will call
for lost relics to be seized, returned, and cataloged for study. In this way, the
illicit demand for cultural property will shrink and this generation will begin to
realize the fruits of protecting the history of both China and the world.
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